London, 27 December, Pantomimes, carols and dry January Part #1, by Thibaud de Barmon

Seasons’ greetings!

It is a beautiful coincidence that the most meaningful Brexit development since the referendum happens in the run up of our festive season. Nearly two weeks ago, 14 December, the European Council agreed that there had been enough progress on the issues of the British financial liabilities to the EU, the rights of the EU citizens living in the UK and the future of the Irish border, to allow the Brexit talks to move to their second phase, the one that will define the long-term trading relationship between the UK and the EU after 2019.

Our Brexit columnists have been extremely inspired by the recent burst of activity and their writings covered all aspects of the festive season: the stage performances of the protagonists, the praises and carols of the deal itself and finally some sober thoughts on what is likely to follow. For each of these three threads our newspapers offered very telling insights. This is why, in the next three posts of Brexit In A Bottle we will cover each of them in turn. Let’s start with the acts that led to the deal itself.

The Pantomimes

Everybody agrees that there has been quite a bit of action in the two weeks that preceded the “deal”. Epithets ranged from “melodrama” (Christopher Booker, the Telegraph), to “Brexitshambles” (Jonathan Freedland, the Guardian) or “blusters and theatrics” (Owen Jones, the Guardian) and “absurd pantomime” (Janet Daley, the Telegraph). Indeed even by usual EU talks’ standards, these unfolded in many unexpected ways. Here is a brief summary to the mains events.

It all started 10 November. After another round of fruitless negotiations between David Davis and Michel Barnier, the EU sends what many saw as an ultimatum to the UK side: without significant movements in British negotiating position in the following two weeks the Commission will recommend to the European Council of 14 December that Brexit talks cannot move to their second phase meant to cover the long-term trade arrangements between the UK and the EU.

For the following ten days, unofficial negotiations are progressing and, surprisingly this time, seem to advance according to plan. On the 23rd of November, the broad terms of the financial settlement and of the rights of the EU citizens are agreed. Optimistically Theresa May suggests to Jean-Claude Juncker that they meet in Brussels on December 4 to finalise and announce to the press the whole package. Then bursts the issue of the Irish border to the centre stage.

Friday 22nd, Theresa May and the Irish premier, Leo Varadkar, meet informally in Gothenburg, Sweden. Mr Varadkar is irritated by the lack of involvement of his government in the talks and makes it clear that Ireland would veto any deal that doesn’t propose credible solutions to the Irish border. Quickly talks become trilateral (the Commission and the UK and Irish governments). On the 30th, to ensure the absence of physical border after Brexit, a compromise wording, proposing « no regulatory divergence » between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, is agreed by the negotiating teams in Brussels but rejected by Theresa May. Negotiations continues over the weekend and a new compromise emerges on Sunday the 3rd. It proposes « full regulatory alignment ». All is now set for Theresa May and Jean-Claude Juncker to hold, the next day, the joint press conference they had planned two weeks before earlier.

Early that morning and just before Theresa May boards her plane to Belgium, the Northern Irish Unionists of the DUP are informed of the wording the agreement (apparently through leaks by Irish media). Their initial reaction is unequivocally negative as they see it as putting Northern Ireland in a different regulatory framework as the rest of the UK. Nevertheless Theresa May decides to take her plan and fly to Brussels. Just when she finishes her lunch, the DUP leader, Arlene Forster, decides to go public and issues a statement both rejecting the deal and threatening to end their support to government. Without these 11 DUP MPs, the Conservatives lose their majority in the Commons. Theresa May has no other choice than back down in front of both the press and the Commission and fly back to London empty-handed.

Follow four days of intense talks this time between the British government and the DUP. On Thursday the 7th of December, the British government proposes that ‘full alignment’ will apply to whole of the UK and agrees that it will persist ‘in the absence of any agreed solutions’ that is, as long all parties agree with another arrangement. These terms are put to the Cabinet and are endorsed even by its most eurosceptic members. They are also put to the DUP who refuses to formally either endorse or reject it.

In the morning of the following and for the second time in the same week Theresa May board her plane to Brussels to present the terms to the deal without explicit support from her coalition partners.

This time the Unionists hold fire and the joint press conference with Jean-Claude Juncker proceeds as planned. Over the weekend, prominent Conservatives eurosceptics publicly confirm their support to the agreement and the Commission formally recommends it to the European Council. On Thursday, the 14th, the Council formally approves it and uncharacteristically offers Theresa May a round of applause for her efforts.

The critics’ verdicts

Railing about Brussels’ drama has been a constant in the eurosceptic press. Yet this time very few columnists blames the Commission for this rollercoaster. The most noticeable one has been Janet Daley of the Telegraph (After a week of preposterous grandstanding and melodrama, now the Brexit fun really begins, 9 December). “We don’t need to retrace the steps of what looked like a tragedy until it turned into a farce. Suffice to say that the head office of the pantomime horse was occupied by our old friends on the European Commission and the rear end was filled Mr Varadka”. Yes, the U.K. government has sometimes be casual in its dealing of Irish sensitivities but it shouldn’t have entertained “the Brussels game of ritual mortification which must be visited upon Britain.(…) This is not a negotiation, it is a hostage crisis, in which payment (in both cash and abnegation) must be agreed before the terms of release can even be discussed”.

The Telegraph’s Brexit editor, Asa Bennett (European leaders are holding Theresa May close in the hope she doesn’t walk away, 15 December) also senses Brussels’ theatrical taste. “Out of respect to their desire to show ‘unity’ against Britain, (European Leaders) have carefully choreographed their behaviour. That has been clear at recent summits such as when Mrs May suddenly had Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel up alongside in front of the cameras. Such scenes do not happen in Brussels by accident.”

Nevertheless to all other Brexit commentators, including the most unsympathetic to ‘Brussels’, the first week of December simply laid bare the weaknesses of the British positions. The Telegraph’ staunchly eurosceptic Charles Moore, illustrates this vulnerability more colourfully “Mr Barnier is like the crocodile in Peter Pan. He has just swallowed Britain’s hand and liked the taste”. Camilla Cavendish in the Financial Times (A second referendum is in the Tory party’s interests, 9 December) points to lack of leverage “Brexit is looking more and more like a poker game in which one side holds most of the cards, and the other has given up bluffing”.

James Forsyth in the Spectator points towards a lack of bandwidth against a much better resourced side. How could the government agreed terms with both the Commission and the Irish government without even consulting the Northern Ireland Unionists? “The answer starts in No. 10, that is hopelessly understaffed at a time when the demands on it has never been greater”.

But as most of Guardian’s columnists insist there was also serious lacks of judgement and character. Owen Jones combines both (The Tories’ pointless theatrics wasted months. Now the hard part, 8 December) and concludes that after 18 months, ‘Brexit means Brexit’, ‘red, white and blue Brexit’ and ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ have filled the front pages but yielded close to nothing.

This is where form and substance finally meet, this is also where the Brexit usual fault lines reappears. One and half year after the referendum, a written document has finally emerged and has been endorsed by the key parties to the Brexit process. Behind the twists and the drama what does this text approved by actually means to the various protagonists? Many, many different things to many, many different writers and these will be the focus of next week post.

London, 20 November, the Brexit game theories by Thibaud de Barmon

In June 2017, precisely when the Brexit negotiations started, Google Deepmind retired its Go playing supercomputer, AlphaGo. In operation for two years, It had beaten all the best Go players and had not much more to prove. Five months later, the Brexit negotiations are still languishing and few would argue that the protagonists have a lot to learn from the latest of artificial intelligence and game theories.

On 14 and 15 December 2017 the European Council will meet and assess the progress of the negotiations. If it concluded these have sufficiently progressed it will agree to move to their second phase and start discussing the nature of the future relationship between the EU and the UK. Such critical milestone and the stalemate in the talks are blessings for political columnists. It give them endless sources of inspiration to ponder how we got there and to devise how we could get out of it.

In this ninth edition of Brexit In A Bottle we lay out few of their most popular advice.

The hardballers

The hardballers became the most prominent Brexit strategists when in January 2017 Theresa May stated that “no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal”. Eleven months on, this stance is no longer government policy, yet few hardballers can still be seen in the newspapers. There are three types of them.

First there are those who believe tough stance is the only language the EU understands, that in any EU negotiations posturing matters as much as substance and that absence of it will be seen as signs of weakness. In the Spectator, the historian Robert Tombs, adds some historical clout to this argument (Michel Barnier’s arrogant inflexibility over Brexit comes from a long Gallic tradition, 27 October). Negotiations are not progressing because David Davis and Michel Barnier “seem to be inhibiting different mental universe, (…) and we have been having this problem for at least two centuries”. Talleyrand and William Pitt on the Treaty of Amiens, Raymond Poincare and Lord Curzon at the Conference of Lausanne, De Gaulle and MacMillan on the joining… the EEC, again and again British pragmatism and humour hits a wall of French dogmatism and arrogance. As everybody knows, “the British try to be relaxed and friendly, and to lighten the atmosphere with humour. The French are much more formal and hierarchical, and often take backslapping and jokes as a sign of disrespect and superficiality.” From there stalemate can only ensue and there is only one way to escape from it: take the other side’s armoury and oppose similar inflexibility, “if they find that their interlocutors refuse to accept their impeccable logic, the French, in a different application of logic itself, will often cut a last-minute deal”. Let the British become Frenchier than French and progress will follow.

The second strand of hardballers are those who believe that Britain can simply afford an exit without a deal. As bad economic news have been piling up these past couple of months, this strand has become less and less visible. In the past few weeks Liam Halligan was their flag bearer. In the Spectator (No deal with the EU? Sounds like a good deal to me, 8 November) he explains that negotiating with Brussels is pointless because trading under WTO rules would “in no way stop the UK trade with the EU, as some gloom-mongers claim. All nations have access to the single market provided that standards are met and the generally low tariffs are paid.” As businesses start presenting their contingency plans and how many jobs they will move to the continent, this vision of pain free hard Brexit is becoming less and less present in the press.

Lastly there are those, like Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in the Telegraph (Never bluff the EU: if Britain talks defiance it must be deadly serious, 11 October), who agree with the first argument (hardballing can work) but reject the second (no deal would be pain free). His conclusion is that hardballing can’t be just a bluff but has to be part of a wider cold-hearted plan preceded by serious and visible preparations. Without them, it becomes a “dangerous gamble. It is the sort of thinking that led the Syriza rebels in Greece to so gravely misjudge the Eurogroup, and why the much-bruised Yanis Varoufakis warned the Tories never to fall into this negotiated trap”.

The softballers

Most soft ballers come from the europhile family. Their central argument remains that leaving will have material effects on the economy and they see the negotiations, especially on the exit bill, as a way to soften these. To that two other arguments have also emerged. First these talks shouldn’t be compared to the negotiations of the British rebate in the 80’s but to accession talks in reverse. They shouldn’t be likened to the postering of European summits but to the tick boxing of trade talks and membership negotiations. To progress they require transparency, bureaucracy and attention to technical details. The second new argument is even simpler: deal or no deal, Britain will need enormous amount of goodwill after it has left the Union to sort out the practicalities of the transition. Accommodating negotiating styles are the only ways to achieve that.

On the money front, Martin Wolf (Britain has to offer more money for a smooth Brexit, Financial Times, 2 November) notes that even meeting the EU demand of a €60 billion would only represent 2.5% of the British GDP. Notwithstanding that the UK can borrow such amount at very low cost, if this sum allows a smooth transition to Britain’s post-Brexit economic model then it becomes even more affordable because such model will take up to 10 years to be implemented . “If I was a Brexiter, I would want the people to look back on this event as a well-executed, smooth and harmonious process”.

Juliet Samuel in the Telegraph (Even if we leave the EU without a deal we will still need goodwill to avoid a major economic shock, 22 October) also sees softballing as the best way to play the long game. First because even under WTO the UK and the EU will have to agree on many things, from air travels to customs checks, to avoid a chaotic transition. Further down the line, good will be necessary to pave the way to a future trade agreement even if it is signed in 2030.

She also notes that there tends to be something about those who negotiate to challenge a status quo and here again the Greek experience is put forward. To her, Yanis Varoufakis main mistake “was to make himself politically intolerable to the European politicians whose support he needed – by calling them ‘incompetent’, accusing them of ‘fiscal waterboarding’ and using provocative examples such as German war debts. (…) With Theresa May’s Florence speech and Boris Johnson’s apparent newfound ability to stop insulting Europeans for no gain, Britain has decisively moved away from Mr Varoufakis’s strategy of picking unnecessary, rhetorical arguments. This is welcome”.

It may also prove short-lived… Three weeks after this column was published, speaking to a business conference in Germany, David Davis, the Brexit Secretary of State, openly blamed France and Germany for stalling the talks.

The Divers

Finally there are those who note that Britain can’t have a successful negotiation because it hasn’t set out its long term strategic objectives and because it has to rely on too many variables outside its control. The negotiations should thus be about damage limitation and not much else. Forget hard or softballing, best is to dive and hope that the other side will do the mistakes… or show mercy.

Gideon Rachman (Brexit Britain is at Europe’s mercy, Financial Times, 14 November) believes that the unresolved debates within the British government mean that “it is increasingly likely the UK government will simply be politically and technically incapable of delivering a negotiated Brexit”. Even if it would, the political uncertainties that would follow mean that “Britain’s negotiating position cannot assumed to be final”. The EU and the EU leaders “might well conclude that there is no point in making significant moves now”. All the negotiation team can hope for is avoiding damaging moves and harvesting some mistakes by the other side.

To this the Economist (Brexit delusion flourish in Britain’s fevered political climate, 19 October) adds the Brexit delusions “as the Brexit talks show, the EU follows cumbersome but legally predictable procedures, mostly led by the European Commission, in any negotiation. It would be a step towards recognising this if pro- and anti-Brexiteers alike dropped their delusions to the contrary.”

This sense of powerlessness is certainly the main development of these past few weeks. For the first year after the referendum, the Brexit debate was mostly a conversation between the various British political factions, after the summer it remained so but the Commission’s attitude was nonetheless added to the mix. When Angela Merkel won the German elections, in September these views felt vindicated as events appeared to stay in known territories.

The political crisis in Ireland and the change of tone about the border issue, the collapse of the coalition talks in Germany and the possibility that Angela Merkel may not be chancellor after all, Spain’s gardening stance on Gibraltar, all have a visible impact on commentators. With it comes the realisation that whatever your side, the process is becoming less and less predictable and strategies less and less pertinent. For the audience, these mean less entertainment and fewer game theories. For the politicians, these mean more home works and more pragmatism. For all of us that could mean a change attitude for the better.

Steve Bell for the Guardian, 21 November 2017.

Beyond Brexit – why more controls of eurozone financial flows also matters by Thibaud de Barmon

A brilliant paper by Martin Sandbu in the Financial Times last week (How I learnt to love current account deficits, https://www.ft.com/content/bfa939f6-c602-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656?desktop=true).

Brilliant because it raises an important issue but also because it puts forward and far more eloquently ideas I developed in my post of 27 September (The euro needs a New Deal, not a new dawn): the need for more controls of the financial flows within the eurozone.

Here are few key extracts.

“It is an accepted tenet among right-thinking observers of the international macroeconomy that current account deficits and surpluses between countries can be dangerous. That is why they tend to call such non-zero current accounts “imbalances” — implying something that cannot stand — than the more neutral “asymmetries”.

They are not wrong, although as Free Lunch has written at length, the danger is sometimes exaggerated. (A constant surplus is no drag on growth, only an increasing one is. Current account asymmetries can, however, accumulate to unsustainable debt claims over time; the policy solution is to channel capital flows into non-debt investments.) (…)

it is not the size of the flows that matter, but how the financing is invested. The problem of Greece, Ireland and Spain was not their large current account deficits but that the economic room for manoeuvre these deficits created was used to increase consumption or wasteful investment (ill-judged real estate) rather than the most productivity-enhancing capital, whatever these countries’ equivalent of North Sea oil might be.

How could this be ensured? Through better domestic economic and regulatory policy, for one, but also by favouring foreign direct investment and equity flows, rather than debt (in particular bank debt). National governments retain many tools to influence the form capital flows take, for example through the tax treatment of different types of investment.”

Londres, 3 octobre 2017, The EU Repeal Bill par Thibaud de Barmon

Une loi digne d’un Roi ! 

Traduit de l’anglais par Mickaël Rigault

Depuis deux mois un processus peu commenté a agité éditorialistes et constitutionnalistes. Celui assurant que l’ensemble de la législation européenne appliquée par les tribunaux britanniques reste applicable une fois que le Royaume-Uni ne sera plus membre de l’Union Européenne. En Octobre 2016, le Gouvernement a annoncé que ce processus serait mis en œuvre par la promulgation d’une seule loi, la loi sur le retrait de l’Union Européenne (plus connue sous le nom de Repeal Bill).

 Le 11 septembre dernier, le projet de loi attenant est passé en première lecture devant la Chambre des Communes. Cela qui signifie que les parlementaires ont voté en faveur des mérites d’une telle loi mais pas encore sur ses modalités d’application. Le projet doit passer désormais en commission à une date qui reste à déterminer et c’est à ce moment que les parlementaires débuteront le travail sur ces modalités avant une deuxième lecture devant la Chambre des Communes. La durée de ce processus dépendra du nombre d’amendements discutés par lesdites commissions et peut durer de nombreux mois. On s’attend à ce que la loi soit promulguée d’ici le courant de l’année 2018.

 

Un contrôle des dommages collatéraux?

 Tous les tenants du débat sur le Brexit reconnaissent que l’intégration de la législation européenne dans le système juridique britannique ne peut être réalisée dans le cadre des procédures législatives ordinaires. Les commentateurs estiment qu’entre 12 000 et 20 000 textes de législation européennes sont actuellement appliqués au Royaume-Uni. Pour donner un ordre de grandeur, en termes législatifs britanniques, cela pourrait représenter plus de 800 lois et près de 8 000 règlements. A titre de comparaison, depuis l’an 2000 le Parlement britannique n’a édicté qu’entre 24 et 55 lois chaque année.

 Très précocement, le gouvernement avait indiqué que le départ de l’UE impliquerait également une sortie du marché unique et et de la juridiction de la Cour Européenne de Justice. Cette position a été confirmée par les principaux discours de Theresa May sur le Brexit à la Lancaster House en Janvier et plus récemment à Florence. Juridiquement ceci signifie que les lois européennes cesseront d’être applicables par les tribunaux anglais à partir de mars 2019.

 L’intégration de ces lois dans le corpus juridique national est donc impérative et le Repeal Bill est l’outil permettant au Gouvernement de réaliser ce processus en masse. Comme David Allen Green l’explique si bien dans son blog du Financial Times (What’s next for Brexit withdrawal bill, 12 septembre) le projet vise à résoudre deux problèmes, le premier, maintenir la continuité juridique dans les références au droit communautaire et plus particulièrement à la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE. Le second, limiter l’incertitude juridique liée au fait que les tribunaux britanniques ne seront plus liés à la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne de Justice et devront donc faire leur propres interprétations des lois nationales remplaçant la législation européenne.

 La réponse du gouvernement à ce double enjeu a été l’utilisation à grande échelle d’un instrument législatif appelé la « clause Henry VIII » permettant au Parlement d’autoriser le gouvernement à légiférer par décret sur un ensemble de lois et pour une période limitée afin qu’elles puissent devenir rapidement et efficacement applicables sans engorger le pouvoir judiciaire. Plus que la loi elle-même c’est l’usage de cette clause qui est particulièrement controversée.

Une perte de contrôle ? 

 En toute honnêteté, la presse dans son ensemble n’a pas été particulièrement inspirée par ce sujet. Le Spectator est resté quasiment silencieux et l’Economist n’y a consacré qu’une demi-colonne. Le Guardian et le Telegraph ont publié tous deux trois colonnes au cours des cinq dernières semaines. Le Financial Times a été sans doute le plus actif avec pas moins d’une demi-douzaine de commentaires pendant un mois.

 Ce journal et le Guardian ne remettent pas en cause la nécessité d’une telle loi mais tous deux se retrouvent pour trouver son mode d’adoption hautement problématique.

Pour Dominic Grieve, avocat renommé et parlementaire du parti conservateur (Brexit is not an excuse to tame parliament, Financial Times, 2 septembre) explique que le problème réside dans la façon que la loi met à mal la séparation des pouvoirs. Il y voit deux risques. Le premier est que l’usage des pouvoirs exécutifs est si large et que le contrôle parlementaire est si restreint qu’il va inévitablement conduire à des décisions contradictoires qui vont accroître le risque d’incertitude juridique qu’ils cherchent à limiter. 

Dans un second temps, le risque est d’étendre le processus législatif jusqu’à ces limites constitutionnelles et par conséquent de porter atteinte à des usages constitutionnelles clés. Un tel abus de pouvoir dans un pays régi par une constitution non écrite peut causer des dommages irréversibles. Il conclut qu’insister pour un contrôle des modalités juridiques du Brexit n’est pas subvertir la décision du référendum. “L’électorat n’a pas voté pour « reprendre le contrôle » pour voir notre constitution démantelée”.

 Pour des raisons similaires David Allen Green (What’s next for Brexit withdrawal bill, Financial Times, 12 septembre) observe que l’utilisation de la clause Henry VIII va au bien au delà ce qui est nécessaire et constitue un assaut sur la démocratie parlementaire.

 Comme on pouvait s’y attendre le Guardian a des vues très ancrées sur la question. Polly Toynbee (The Brexit bill is cataclysmic. Only a swerve will save us, 6 septembre) décrit le projet comme cataclysmique même si son exposé semble s’appliquer plus aux parlementaires du parti Conservateur qu’au projet de loi lui-même.

 Dans cet parution le commentaire le plus exhaustif est venu de Rafael Behr (The EU withdrawal bill is nothing less than an executive coup, 14 septembre). Ici encore le besoin d’une loi est reconnu mais la façon dont les pouvoirs exécutifs sont utilisés sont décrits à la fois comme étant injustifiés et dangereux. Il y voit trois principaux écueils, l’étendue, la durée et l’applicabilité de ces pouvoirs.

 Sur la question de l’étendue, les clauses Henry VIII peuvent modifier toute loi existante y compris celles qui ne sont pas issues du droit communautaire. La seule limite est qu’il n’est pas possible de créer de nouveaux crimes et de nouveaux impôts. Cela signifie que le gouvernement peut modifier en profondeur les législations sociales, commerciales, les lois sur la propriété ou toute réglementation sans avoir à consulter le Parlement. 

Sur leur durée d’application, régie par la clause de « crépuscule » (sunset clause), les définitions restent très génériques. La loi dispose que les pouvoirs exécutifs ne peuvent être utilisés pendant plus de deux ans après le « jour de sortie ». Mais ce jour n’est pas défini et il n’existe pas de procédure pour le définir. En présumant une période de transition de trois ans, le gouvernement pourrait ainsi utiliser ces pouvoirs jusqu’en 2024. 

Enfin sur l’applicabilité, les ministres peuvent utiliser ces pouvoirs dès qu’ils en jugent l’utilisation “appropriée” plutôt que lorsqu’elle est “nécessaire”. Juridiquement c’est une distinction importante car la seconde formulation implique une qualification juridique au contraire de la première. Ceci signifie que l’utilisation de ces pouvoirs par le gouvernement sera difficile à contrecarrer dans les tribunaux.

 La conclusion de Rafael Behr est simplement que la loi constitue une sorte de coup d’état destiné à appliquer “un anesthésiant général au Parlement afin que (Theresa May) puisse envoyer le corpus législatif ritannique au bloc opératoire où elle, David Davis, Liam Fox, Boris Johnson et les autres couperaient, raccommoderaient, détourneraient et amputeraient tout ce qu’ils jugent “approprié””. 

Il est naïf et irresponsable de penser que les conventions non écrites et la retenue des responsables politiques éviteront les abus. Comme l’élection de Donald Trump l’a montré, tout pouvoir, y compris dans les démocraties les plus éprouvées, peut tomber entre de mauvaises mains. Sa recommandation au gouvernement et au parti conservateur est qu’ils devraient réfléchir à deux fois à ce qui pourrait arriver si dans quelques années la loi étaient entre les mains d’un gouvernement au un programme très partisan. 

 

Un contrôle obsédant ?

 De façon peu surprenante, les éditorialistes eurosceptiques du Telegraph voient la situation d’un œil différent. Asa Bennett (If remainers derail the Repeal Bill, they will send Britain tumbling into the Brexit abyss, 11 septembre) et Tom Harris (If Labour votes against the Great Repeal Bill, it’s because it’s decided to foil Brexit, 5 septembre) pensent que ces problèmes sont uniquement des critiques biaisées partisanes de personnes qui ne souhaitent pas que le Brexit se produise.

 Tom Harris insiste sur les incohérences du parti travailliste. Le parti a approuvé le déclenchement de l’article 50 en Février, a démissionné des parlementaires ayant voté contre le départ du Royaume-Uni du marché unique en juin et désormais a voté contre la loi qui permettrait à ces deux choses de se produire. « Peut-être que Jeremy Corbin est enfin parvenu à atteindre une impossibilité politique : rendre son parti aussi cohérent que celui de John Major. (…) Il semble que le parti travailliste s’opposera à la grande loi d’annulation par principe. Et cela ressemble à ce que c’est en réalité : une tentative de faire échouer le Brexit ».

 Asa Bennett va au-delà des questions politiciennes et considère la substance de l’argument. Pour lui l’utilisation extensive de la clause Henri VIII est inévitable en raison des objectifs de la loi : une multiplication par deux du corpus législatif national en moins de deux ans. Il pointe également du doigt que cette procédure n’est pas sans précédent. La loi de 1972 sur les Communautés Européennes l’a utilisé pour intégrer l’acquis communautaire (c’est-à-dire toute la législation européenne précédant l’adhésion à la communauté économique européenne). Ce précédent s’est avéré très efficace et a permis une transition douce vers une adhésion totale. Maintenant que le processus va en sens inverse appliquer la même procédure n’est pas seulement raisonnable, c’est avisé. Prétendre le contraire est simplement intellectuellement malhonnête.

 

De contrôles aériens et de décollages

 La façon dont ce projet de loi et son développement sont perçus outre-Manche sont absents du débat. La commission et les leaders européens ont énoncés clairement que l’intégrité des institutions européennes et du marché unique sont leur priorités absolues. Cela signifie qu’ils s’attendent à ce qu’un accord post-Brexit soit conclu avec un partenaire fiable développant un modèle économique compatible avec celui du marché unique. 

Ils seraient certainement réticents à accorder un accès large au marché si du jour au lendemain la Grande Bretagne se transformait en sorte de Singapour-sur-Tamise, un paradis fiscal ou un champion des monopoles soutenus par l’État. Or en son état actuel, le projet de loi pourrait permettre à tout gouvernement, conservateur ou travailliste, de procéder à de tels changements d’un coup de plume. A ce jour aucun commentateur ou politicien britannique n’a fait allusion à cette problématique.

 Désormais la discussion du Repeal Bill demeure fermement britannique. Car dans la Grande Bretagne du Brexit les débats qui ont de l’importance restent essentiellement casaniers. Qu’il s’agisse du Repeal Bill, mais également de la période de transition, où des droits des citoyens européens, et le débat se poursuit ici à la maison derrières des portes grande ouvertes, sans accorder trop d’importance à ce que les voisins pourraient en penser. C’est bien la Grande Bretagne du Brexit approchant du tarmac pour le décollage, son équipage occupé à débattre du plan de vol sans consulter la tour de contrôle et persuadés qu’ils pourront l’appeler une fois l’altitude de croisière atteinte.

Londres, 27 août, Brexit et politique quantique par Thibaud de Barmon

Traduit de l’anglais par Mickaël Rigault

Au début du mois d’Août, nous nous étions penchés sur la question de savoir comment le Brexit allait se dérouler et sur les différentes options qui se profilaient. Plus d’un an après le référendum et deux mois après les élections législatives, on pourrait penser que ces options seraient les seules questions qui font encore débat.
Bienvenue en Grande-Bretagne du Brexit, là où les choses ne se déroulent pas tout à fait dans l’ordre ! La Grande-Bretagne du Brexit où 18 mois après le référendum les arguments pour ou contre le Brexit hantent toujours les unes des journaux.

L’été approche son zénith et un nombre inattendu d’articles en sont encore à promouvoir ou à rejeter le bien-fondé même du Brexit. Que ce soit sur l’économie, le commerce, la souveraineté ou l’immigration, on ne voit aucun signe de trêve estivale et un nouvel arrivant pourrait penser que le référendum se tiendrait dans les prochaines semaines.

Est-ce betement économique?

Sur les sujets économiques et commerciaux, les vieux arguments continuent de dominer. Pour les tenants du Brexit, le déficit commercial de 60 milliards de livres Sterling entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Union Européenne signifie que le pays a tout à gagner à retrouver une politique commerciale indépendante. Sur le long terme, une politique de libre échange et de rupture avec la règlementation européenne rendra l’économie plus dynamique et lui permettre d’aligner sa croissance sur celles des économies les plus dynamiques comme celles des États-Unis, du Canada ou du Japon.

L’historien Robert Tombs considère (The Myth of Britain’s Decline, paru le 24 juillet) dans le Spectator qu’il existe des tendances plus longues et que « dans la durée, l’appartenance ou la non-appartenance à l’Union Européenne n’a eu pas d’impact perceptible sur notre perfomance économique » et que « le Brexit était un vote de confiance dans notre capacité à concevoir notre futur (économique) ». Simon Heffner quant à lui, dans le Telegraph (These attempts to subvert Brexit will harm the economy, 28 juillet) développe une théorie inhabituelle selon laquelle un Brexit « doux » conduira à un désastre économique car il ne fera qu’ajouter de l’incertitude sans permettre de libérer le potentiel de l’économie britannique.
Comme d’habitude les éditorialistes du Financial Times et de The Economist sont en désaccord et voient dans le ralentissement économique le signe d’une dégradation plus importante à venir.

Retour à la tour de contrôle?

Mais quand il s’agit d’économie nous ne pourrons avoir de certitudes que d’ici quelques temps. Sur les sujets de souveraineté et d’immigration, il en va autrement car il s’agit de deux questions où le Brexit va probablement donner raison à ceux qui le soutiennent.

Sur les questions de souveraineté néanmoins on voit arriver une nouveauté dans l’abondance de références historiques qui n’adoucissent guère les positions des uns et des autres. Des bureaucrates Austro-hongrois, aux révolutionnaires français ou aux bolchéviques russes toutes indiquent un durcissement supplémentaire du débat.

Encore une fois Robert Tombs dans le Financial Times cette fois-ci (Sovereignty still makes sense, even in a globalised world, 4 juillet) écrit que nous ne devrions pas être leurrés. L’Union Européenne n’est pas la construction post-moderne, supranationale et libérale que ses tenants soutiennent, mais ressemble plus à un vieil empire dysfonctionnel du 19ème siècle, qui « comme un trou noir politique, aspire la souveraineté de ses États membres, mais que l’agrégat de souveraineté s’évapore (…) L’empire britannique a été décrit comme un brontosaure avec d’énormes membres vulnérables que le système nerveux central n’avait pas la capacité de protéger, diriger ou contrôler. La même chose pourrait s’appliquer à l’UE dont les faiblesses pourraient le détruire. De la même façon, le vieil empire Austro-hongrois pouvait uniquement espérer laisser ses peuples dans un éternel état d’insatisfaction gérable. L’UE fait face à un futur similaire».

Pour les éditorialistes europhiles, les points de vue des eurosceptiques sur la souveraineté ne sont pas juste erronés, ils sont les fantaisies de dangereux idéologues. Martin Wolf (Britain is incapable of managing Brexit and calamity will follow, le 13 juillet) dans le Financial Times, dresse des parallèles avec les révolutionnaires français dont le règne chaotique et autoritaire bien qu’éphémère a précédé le règne de Bonaparte. Selon lui « les partisans du Brexit sont les Jacobins de la politique britannique. Leur intensité idéologique va décimer le parti Conservateur et amener les questions politiques à être réduites à néant. Il en résulte ni une sortie confortable du Brexit ni une manière plausible de le gérer paisiblement. Ce que les dieux cherchent à détruire il cherchent d’abord à le rendre fou. Désormais il en va de même du Brexit».

John Harris dans son article du Guardian (Revolutions are for zealots and fools as the Brexit Bolsheviks will find out, le 20 juillet dresse lui aussi une comparaison avec les révolutions passées. Selon lui les partisans du Brexit sont comme les Bolchéviques qui en 1917 ont été surpris par leur percée et sans réel plan en tête ont opté pour l’improvisation dans leurs débuts chaotiques. La différence entre les deux mouvements consiste « dans le fait qu’alors que le projet révolutionnaire des bolchéviques a survécu à sa période trouble, celui des Brexiters travaillistes semble s’écrouler avant même d’avoir commencé ». Si le Parti Conservateurs est amené à retrouver son statut de parti mesuré et pragmatique alors la ligne reconstruite à partir de l’histoire récente du parti s’articulera sur une notion fondamentale : les révolutions sont largement faites pour les zélotes et les charlots».

Ou retour au point de rupture? 

Ces échanges peuvent sonner acerbes mais à l’égard de ceux sur l’immigration ils restent ternes voire académiques. Plus d’un an après la fin de la campagne du référendum, les visions apocalyptiques d’un pays au bord de l’implosion ont gardé tout leur poids.

Dans le Guardian, John Harris (They say after Brexit there’ll be food rotting in the fields, It’s already started, le 5 août) nous rapporte les premiers signes de pénurie de main d’oeuvre dans l’industrie alimentaire et conclut que « seuls les plus zélés des Brexiters se projettent dans un futur hautement incertain dans lequel nous rejetons l’immense quantité de nourriture que nous importons d’Europe et que nous trouvons une manière soit de la produire nous-même soit de l’importer par avion du monde entier. Au-delà de la perspective stupide d’accroitre l’empreinte carbone de la nourriture consommée ainsi que des fruits et légumes de base congelé jusqu’à leur date de péremption. De telles visions obtuses pourraient se heurter à un gros problème : les effets du Brexit vont faire qu’il ne restera plus grand-chose de l’industrie agro-alimentaire britannique, une perspective étrange pour des patriotes auto-proclamés, mais voilà c’est bien là où nous en sommes”.

Mais il ne s’agit que d’un secteur et d’un type de migrants, qu’en est-il de l’économie au sens large et du fardeau pour le pays et les finances publiques dans leur ensemble. Philip Johnston développe dans le Telegraph (Theresa May has been very generous to EU national. But who will pay the bill? le 28 juin) l’idée insolite selon laquelle de nombreux ressortissants de l’UE sont un poids économique pour le pays en raison de leur utilisation des services publics en comparaison avec les contributions des citoyens britanniques vivant dans l’UE. Pour lui les ressortissants européens sont peut-être plus jeunes que leurs pairs britanniques sur le continent mais ils ont plus de personnes à charge. En conséquence l’offre du gouvernement concernant les droits des citoyens européens est en réalité très généreuse quand on considère leur charge pour le NHS et d’autres services publics. Elle devrait être récompensée par des offres équivalentes sur les droits des citoyens britanniques vivant en Europe mais également déduite de la facture de séparation car « nous avons peut être fait une offre généreuse pour permettre aux ressortissants européens de rester, mais la question de qui doit payer reste un mystère. Annuler une grande partie de la facture de séparation serait un bon départ.»

Leo McKinstry également dans le Telegraph (If Britain takes its time leaving, it could end up as the EU’s migrant dumping ground) va lui plus loin et considère ceux qui ne sont pas encore arrivés. Même si l’argument reste largement hypothétique il n’en est pas moins spectaculaire. De larges extraits de son éditorial valent qu’on les cite en entier. « L’UE a toujours été obsédé avec la liberté de mouvement, non pas parce qu’elle est une nécessité économique mais car elle est un véhicule pour détruire les identités nationales. Dans la bouche des idéologues pro-européens, le nouveau super état fédéral s’élèvera sur les cendres des nations anachroniques. C’est pourquoi les fédéralistes sont si furieux à propos du Brexit. En conséquence le Royaume-Uni doit être puni et (…) l’immigration de masse fournit un bâton avec lequel battre la Grande Bretagne. (…) Un rapport confidentiel expose que plus de 6.6 millions de migrants africains sont regroupés au sud de la Méditerranée. (…) Bruxelles pourrait rapidement conférer à un grand nombre de ces migrants la nationalité européenne et les encourager à émigrer vers la Grande Bretagne. En réalité notre pays pourrait servir de vaste décharge et cela pourrait arriver très rapidement. » Le Gouvernement doit cesser d’entretenir le besoin d’accords de transition, quels que soient leur étendue et de leur durée. Il ne s’agit pas de prospérité ou encore de sécurité nationale, c’est l’essence même de l’identité britannique est en jeu.

La physique et les alchimistes.

Et voilà, 19 mois après que David Cameron ait annoncé la tenue du référendum sur l’appartenance à l’UE, les trois thèmes centraux de la campagne continuent à vivre leur vie en se tenant fixement à leurs langage et continuant à croitre d’intensité. Peu importe le résultat du référendum, l’élection de Donald Trump, le cours de la politique sur le continent, un autre Parlement boiteux ou l’échéance du Brexit dans 20 mois. Le débat sur le Brexit continue imperturbable et avec une vigueur renouvelée. Il semble dorénavant disposer de sa propre existence où les faits et les événements externes n’ont plus d’importance et où la logique rationnelle ne s’applique pas.

En référence à ce débat et ses acteurs Nick Cohen dans le Spectator (Our Brexit-backing politicians are making fools of us, Le 27 juillet) dresse un parallèle entre la politique et la physique quantique. Il explique que « la physique moderne ne peut être expliquée, elle ne peut être qu’observée. Comme pour les particules quantiques, je ne saurai dire pourquoi (les politiciens britanniques) sont tels qu’ils sont, tout ce que je peux faire c’est décrire le sort qu’ils nous ont réservé ».

Le manque de logique et une intensité sans cesse croissante ne sont pas des notions étrangères aux physiciens modernes. Ils vous diront que la fusion nucléaire est le meilleur exemple d’une réaction exponentiellement croissante et durable ne pouvant être altérée. Ils vous expliqueront également que ces dernières ont uniquement deux résultats, la première l’extinction une fois que toute la matière a été épuisée ou encore une explosion thermonucléaire. Aucune de celle-ci n’est prometteuse. Mes espoirs vont à la première mais mes préparatifs à la seconde.

London, 3 October – A Bill fit for a King, Thibaud de Barmon

A Bill fit for a King!

Over the past two months a little publicised process has agitated Brexit commentators and constitutionalists: the way to ensure that the body of EU laws enforced by UK courts remains enforceable once the UK is no longer a member of the European Union. In October 2016 the government announced that this process will be conducted through the enactment of a single bill, the EU Withdrawal Bill (also known as the Repeal Bill).

On 11 September the bill has passed its first reading in the Commons. This means that the MPs have voted in favour of its merit but not of its detailed modus operandi. The bill now moves to the committee stage with a date yet to be announced at which point MPs will start working on its modus operandi before it is presented for a second reading to the Commons. The duration of this process will depend on the number of amendments discussed by the said committees and can last for many months. It is expected that the bill will receive Royal Ascent and become law sometime in 2018. 

Damage control?

Both sides of the Brexit debate recognise that the integration of the EU laws into the British legal system cannot be done through the usual legislative processes. Commentators estimate that between 12,000 and 20,000 pieces of EU legislations are currently enforced in the United Kingdom. In British legislative terms this is expected to represent around 800 laws and close to 8,000 statutory instruments. As a comparison, since 2000 the British Parliament has only enacted between 24 and 55 laws each year.

Very early on the government has made it clear that upon departure of the EU the UK will also leave the single market and stop recognising the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. This position has been confirmed by Theresa May’s key speeches on Brexit at Lancaster House in January and more recently in Florence. Legally this means that EU laws will cease to be enforceable by the UK courts post March 2019. 

The incorporation of these laws into the domestic legislation is therefore an imperative and the Repeal Bill is the tool to allow the government to operate this process en masse. As very well explained in David Allen Green’s hugely informative blog (What’s next for the Brexit withdrawal bill, 12 September), the bill aims to address two challenges in particular: maintaining legal continuity as references to EU laws, especially the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, cease to apply; limiting legal uncertainties as British courts will no longer be bound by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and thus will have to make their own interpretations of the domestic laws replacing the EU legislation. 

The government’s answer to these challenges has been an extensive use of a statutory instrument known as the “Henry VIII clause” whereby Parliament allows the executive to legislate by decrees over a particular body of laws and for a limited period of time so that they become enforceable without crippling the judiciary. More than the bill itself it is the use of this particular clause that has been the most controversial. 

Losing back control?

In fairness, not all our newspapers have been particularly inspired by this topic. The Spectator remained mostly silent and the Economist only dedicated half a column. The Guardian and the Telegraph both had three columns in the past five weeks. The most active was certainly the Financial Times with no less than half a dozen commentaries in a month. 

Both this paper and the Guardian express substantial concerns. Neither question the need for a bill but both find its current modus operandi highly problematic. 

To Dominic Grieve, renowned barrister and Conservative MP (Brexit is not an excuse to tame parliament, Financial Times, 2 September) the problem is the way the bill undermines the separation of power. He sees two risks. First, the use of executive powers is so wide and the Parliamentary scrutiny so limited that it will inevitably lead executive decisions that contradict each other and consequently increase the very legal uncertainty it aims to limit. Second, it stretches the legislative process to its constitutional limits and thus undermines key constitutional conventions. Such overreach in a country governed by an unwritten constitution, can have lasting damaging effects. He concludes that “it is not to subvert the decision of the referendum to insist on scrutinising the details. The electorate did not vote to “take back control” to see our domestic constitution dismantled”. 

For similar reasons David Allen Green (What’s next for the Brexit withdrawal bill, 12 September, Financial Times) sees the use of the “Henry VIII clauses go further than necessary (and constitute) assaults on parliamentary democracy”. 

Expectedly the Guardian felt particularly strongly on the issue . Polly Toynbee (The Brexit bill is cataclysmic. Only a swerve will save us, 6 September) describes it “cataclysmic” although her argument seems to apply to Conservatives politicians rather than the bill itself. 

In this paper the most thorough commentary came from Rafael Behr (The EU withdrawal bill is nothing less than an executive coup, 14 September). Here again the need for a bill is acknowledged but the way executive powers are framed are seen as both unjustified and dangerous. He sees three dangers in particular, the remit, the duration and the applicability of these powers. 

On the remit, the Henry VIII clauses can amend any existing legislation including those not originated by the EU. The only limitation is that they cannot create new criminal offence or new taxes. This means that the government can change labour laws, commercial laws, ownership laws or any regulation without consulting Parliament. On the duration or “sunset clauses”, definitions have been left to their most generic. The bill stipulates that the executive powers cannot be used beyond two years after “exit day”, but that day is not being defined nor is any procedure for setting it. Assuming a transitional period of say three years, the government could use these powers until 2024. Lastly, on the applicability ministers are to use its powers when “appropriate” rather than when “necessary”. Legally this is an important distinction because the latter formulation implies some legal tests while the former doesn’t. This means that the use of the powers by the government will be incredibly difficult to challenge in courts. 

Rafael Behr’s conclusion is that the bill is nothing less than a coup, aimed at “applying a general anaesthetic to parliament so that (Theresa May) can whisk the body of British law into an operating theatre, where she, David Davis, Liam Fox, Boris Johnson and the rest will carve, stitch, bypass and amputate whatever they deem ‘appropriate’”. It is naive and irresponsible to assume that that the unwritten conventions and natural restraint will avoid misuses. As the election of Donald Trump has shown, any power, even in the most proven democracy, can fall in the wrong hands. His recommendation to the government and the Conservative party is that they should think harder what would happen if few years down the line the bill is at the disposal of a government with an highly partisan agendas “When designing a weapon, it is a good idea to imagine it falling into the wrong hands.” 

Control freaked?

Surprisingly, the Telegraph’s eurosceptic columnists see things differently. Both Asa Bennett (If remainers derail the Repeal Bill, they will send Britain tumbling into the Brexit abyss, 11 September) and Tom Harris (If Labour votes against the Great Repeal Bill, it’s because it’s decided to foil Brexit, 5 September) think that these concerns are simply disingenuous critics by people who don’t want Brexit to happen.

Tom Harris insists on Labour’s inconsistencies. The Party approved the triggering of Article 50 in February, sacked MPs who voted against the UK leaving the single market in June but now has voted against the very bill that will allow these two things to happen. “Perhaps Jeremy Corbin has achieved the politically impossible at last: making his party look every bit as coherent as John Major’s. (…) It looks like Labour will oppose the Great Repeal Bill in principle. And this looks like what it actually is: attempt to foil Brexit”. 

Asa Bennett looks beyond the politics and considers the substance of the argument. To him the far-reaching use of the Henry VIII clause is inevitable because of what the bill has to achieve: a doubling of the domestic legislations in less than two year. He also points out that it is not unprecedented. The 1972 European Communities Act used the clause to integrate the so-called “Acquis Communautaire” (i.e. European legislation preceding the UK’s membership of the European Economic Community). This precedent proved very effective and allowed a smooth transition to full membership. Now that the process goes into reverse applying the similar provision is not only reasonable, it is very wise. Arguing the opposite is being disingenuous. 

Of air-controls and take-offs

Absent of the debate, the way the bill and its development could be perceived on the other side of the Channel. The Commission and European leaders made it clear that the integrity of the EU institutions and the single market are their paramount priorities. This means that they expect any post-Brexit arrangement to be stroked with a predictable partner developing an economic model compatible with that of the single market. They would wary to agree far-reaching access to the market if the next day Britain reinvents itself as a Singapore on Thames, a tax haven or the champion of state-sponsored monopolies. Yet the bill will allow any future British government, conservative or labour, to do just that at a stroke of a pen. To date no commentator or politician has alluded to this conundrum. 

For now the Repeal Bill discussion remains firmly British. Because this is Brexit Britain where conversations that matter stay at home. Be it the Repeal Bill, but also the transition period, the future deal or the rights of EU nationals, the argument carries on here but behind open doors, oblivious to how the neighbours may receive it. This is Brexit Britain approaching the tarmac for take-off, its crew busy arguing the flight path between themselves and pretty sure they can switch on the ground-control radio once they’ve reached mid-air altitude. 

London, 27 August by Thibaud de Barmon

Brexit and quantum politics

Early August we looked at the question of how to Brexit and the various type of Brexit options that are emerging. More than a year after the referendum, two months after the general election one would think that these would be the only questions to debate about. Welcome to Brexit Britain where things don’t quite go in sequence. Brexit Britain where after 18 months on the front pages the case for Brexit still haunts newspapers’ columns.

As the summer enters its peak, an unexpected number of articles make or reject that very case. Be it on the economy, trade, sovereignty or immigration the midsummer downtempo doesn’t show any sign and any newcomer to the scene would think that the referendum is just few weeks away.

Is the economy stupid?

On the economy and trade, the old arguments still dominate. To the Brexit supporters, the £60 billion trade deficit between the UK and the EU means that the country has much to gain from regaining an independent trade policy. Over the long run, free trade policies and severance from EU regulations will make the economy more dynamic and align its performance to that of the best performing developed economies such as the US, Canada or Japan.

The historian Robert Tombs in the Spectator (The myth of Britain’s decline, July 24) also considers longer trends and insists that “over the long term, membership (or not) of the EU has no discernible impact to our economic performance” and that “Brexit was a vote of confidence in our ability the shape our (economic) future”. Simon Heffer in the Telegraph (These attempts to subvert Brexit will harm the economy, July 28) develops the unorthodox argument that it wouldn’t be a hard but a soft Brexit that will cause economic pain because it will only add uncertainty without unleashing the potentials of the British economy.

As usual all the columnists in the Financial Times and the Economist disagree and see the latest slowdown in economic activity as the sign of more pain to come.

Back to the control room?

But this is just the economy and we won’t know for sure for quite some time. On sovereignty and immigration this is another matter, not least because these are the two areas where Brexit is unlikely to prove its supporters wrong.

On sovereignty there is a novelty: an abundance of historical references that do little to soften positions. From Austro-hungarian bureaucrats, to French revolutionaries or Russian bolsheviks all point towards an hardening of the debate.

Robert Tombs again, in the Financial Times this time, (Sovereignty still makes sense, even in a globalised world, July 4) argues that we shouldn’t be fooled. The EU is not the post-modern, supra-national and liberal construct that its supporters promote, but resembles an old-fashioned dysfunctional 19th century empire. “Like a political black hole, the EU sucks sovereignty from its member states, but the pool of sovereignty drains away. (…) The British empire has been called a ‘brontosaurus with huge, vulnerable limbs which the central nervous system had little capacity to protect, direct, or control’. The same could be said of the EU, whose weaknesses may destroy it. (Similarly) the old Austro-Hungarian empire could only hope to keep its peoples in a manageable state of dissatisfaction. The EU today faces similar prospects”.

For europhile columnists, eurosceptics’ views on sovereignty are not just wrong, they are fantasies of dangerous ideologues. Martin Wolf in the Financial Times (Britain is incapable of managing Brexit and calamity will follow, July 13) draws parallels is between with French revolutionaries whose authoritarian, yet short-lived and chaotic rule preceded the rise of Bonaparte. “The Brexiteers are the Jacobins of the UK politics. Their ideological intensity has devastated the Conservatives party and reduced British politics to its present shambles. There is, as a result, neither a comfortable exit from Brexit nor a plausible way of managing it smoothly. Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad. So it now is over Brexit”.
John Harris in the Guardian (Revolutions are for zealots and fools, as the Brexit Bolsheviks will find out, July 20) also draws some revolutionary parallels. The Brexiteers are like the Bolsheviks in 1917 who taken by surprised by their initial breakthrough and with no real plan in hand, opted to improvise through their chaotic start. The difference between both is “the fact that whereas the former’s revolutionary project survived its most besieged and confused period, the Tory Brexiteers’ seems to be crumpling before it has even got started”. If the Conservative party is to regain its status as the party of measure and pragmatism, “the reconstructed view of the party’s recent history will surely centre on one key understanding: that revolutions are largely for zealots and fools”

Or back to the breaking point?

These exchanges may sound acrimonious but in regards to those on immigration they remain pale and almost academic. More than a year after the end of the referendum campaign, the apocalyptic visions of a country at the breaking point have kept their potency.

In the Guardian, John Harris (They say after Brexit there’ll be food rotting in the fields. It’s already started, August 5) reports on the first sign of labour shortages in the food industry and concludes “the most zealous Brexiteers look forward to a supremely unlikely future in which we spurn the huge amount of food we import from Europe and somehow either produce our own, or fly in stuff from around the globe. Beyond the prospect of stupidly increased food miles and basic fruit and veg suddenly refrigerated to within an inch of its life, such half-baked visions may well bump up against one big problem: the effects of Brexit meaning we may not have much of a British food industry left – a strange thing to be embraced by self-styled patriots, but there we are”.

But this is just one industry and one type of migrants. What about the wider economy and the burden to the country and and the public finances as a whole? Philip Johnston in the Telegraph develops the unconventional  idea (Theresa May has been very generous to EU nationals. But who will pay the bill? June 28) that many EU nationals are actually an economic burden to the country because of their use on public services relative to the contributions of UK citizens living in the EU. To him, EU maybe younger than their British counterparts on the Continent but they have many more dependents. As such the government’s offer on EU nationals’ rights is actually extremely generous considering their burden on the NHS and other services. It should be matched by offers on the rights of British nationals in Europe but also be deducted from the exit bill “so we may have made a generous offer to enable EU nationals to stay here; but how we will pay for it is anyone’s guess. Waiving large chunk of the exit bill would be a start.”

Leo McKinstry, also in the Telegraph (If Britain takes its time leaving, it could end up as the EU’s migrant dumping ground, July 26) goes further and considers those who haven’t arrived yet. Although the argument is largely hypothetical, it is nonetheless sometime spectacular. Large excerpts of his column are worth quoting in full. “The EU has always been obsessed with freedom of movement, not because it is an economic necessity, but because it is a vehicle for destroying traditional national identities. In the narrative of the pro-EU ideologues, the shiny new federal superstate will emerge from the ashes of anachronistic nationhood. That is why ‘fédéralistes’ are so furious at Brexit. As a result the United Kingdom has to be punished and (…) mass migration provides a potential stick with which to beat Britain. (…) A confidential report said 6.6 millions African migrants are now gathered on the southern Mediterranean coast. (…) Brussels could swiftly grant large numbers of these migrants European citizenship and then encourage them to move to Britain. Effectively our country would be used as a vast dumping ground and it could all happen quickly”. The conclusion is that the UK, should leave the EU as soon as possible. The government should stop entertaining the need for transitional arrangements, no matter how short in time or narrow in scope. It is not a question prosperity or even national security, the very existence of the British identity is at stake.

Physics and the alchemists

Here we are, 19 months after David Cameron announced the referendum on the EU membership, the three topics which were central to the campaign, carry on with their life, meticulously sticking with their terms and only growing in intensity. No matter the referendum result, the Trump election, the political developments on the continent, another hung parliament or the Brexit date being 20 months away, the Brexit debate carries unmoved and with a renewed vigour. It seems to have reached a life of its own, where facts and events don’t matter any more, where usual causality doesn’t apply.

Referring to it and its actors, Nick Cohen in the Spectator (Our Brexit-backing politicians are making fools of us, July 27) draws a parallel with quantum physics, “modern physics cannot be understood. It can only be observed. As with quantum particles, I can’t say why (British politicians) are the way they are. All I can do is describe where they have left the rest of us.”

Lack of causal logic and growing intensity are indeed no stranger to modern physicists. They will tell you that nuclear fusion is the best example of this sort of self-sustained and increasingly intense reactions that cannot be altered. They will also tell you that these have only two outcomes, extinction once all matter has been exhausted or thermonuclear explosion, black-hole or supernova. None are promising but I’ll still hope for the former while preparing for the latter.